TIMING OF MALAYSIA

Sir William Goode

SPECIAL EDITION - MALAYSIA DAY 2024 

By William Goode

Jesselton, North Borneo, 7th April, 1962

1.It can hardly be disputed that North Borneo is not ready for Malaysia. The Proposal came as a shock to people who were occupied with developing their own country and had no wish for change. It must take several years at least to develop political leaders, to introduce elections, and to produce a local civil service. In North Borneo’s interest, a transition period of several years is needed before Malaysia is put into effect.

2. This will give time to prepare North Borneo for the change and will enable Malaysia to be built on firmer foundations. Are there any objections to the delay as far as North Borneo is concerned?

3. The first objection raised is that delay will allow the Communists to gain strength. Hitherto the communists have failed to establish any organisation in North Borneo. This is because there have been no emotional issues for them to exploit and no organisations to penetrate: no burning desire for freedom; no anti-colonial movement; no class struggle; no issue over Chinese schools; no trade unions; and until very recently no political parties. As political parties develop, they will provide opportunities for Communist, penetration but at present, the danger is small. Malaysia itself provides the best cover for Communist penetration since there are strong popular feelings against, Malaysia and it has aroused racial fears which can be exploited. The Communists will certainly exploit Malaysia, but, they will profit more from a Malaysia rushed upon an ill-prepared North Borneo, than from a transition period of careful preparation.

4. A second objection is that delay will allow opposition to Malaysia to gather strength. This objection assumes that further consideration of Malaysia will increase opposition rather than persuade those who are now reluctant or suspicious. On the contrary, more time should make it possible to secure a better understanding of the true worth of Malaysia and to overcome present doubts and fears by explaining how North Borneo's interests will be safeguarded. Delay will also remove the accusation that the people of North Borneo were rushed into Malaysia without, being given time to understand its full implications.

5. Another objection is that North Borneo's political leaders will develop a vested interest against surrendering power to the Federal Government. This can be prevented by not allowing any vested interest against, Malaysia, to grow up during the preparatory period. The principle and the broad outline of Malaysia should be agreed now, and the gradual transfer of authority from the British Government and officials to local leaders can then be made in accordance with the agreed final division of authority between the State and Federal Governments. During the preparatory period, North Borneo leaders should not, be given any powers they will not retain when Malaysia is introduced.

6. As far as North Borneo is concerned, the advantages of delay greatly outweigh the disadvantages. Would delay cause insuperable difficulties outside North Borneo?

Cobbold

7. The immediate urgency over Malaysia arose from the political situation in Singapore. Nine months ago Mr. Lee Kuan Yew's Government appeared to be disintegrating; it, was feared that he would lose his majority in the Assembly and be forced to a general election, which would result, In the Communist dominated Barisan Socialis gaining power. Only merger with Malaya and firm control by the Alliance Government, could prevent, the Communists capturing Singapore and then getting full independence from the British Government. But for internal political reasons, the Alliance Government could not carry out merger of Singapore without, at the same time bringing the Borneo territories into Malaysia. Therefore, Malaysia must be introduced rapidly because only immediate intervention by the Alliance Government will prevent the Communists capturing Singapore.

8. Today the situation in Singapore has improved. Mr. Lee Kuan Yew has beaten off the Barisan Socialis attack and exposed their Communist direction. There is no immediate likelihood that he will be defeated in the Assembly. There is no apparent, reason to prevent his Government running its full five year course to May 1964. The Barisan Socialis have lost a series of battles with the P.A.P. Government: Chinese school examinations, the City Council strike, the Workers  Brigade , and in the Assembly. Their strength comes from success and without success it is likely to wane. They have had no success since July last year. They have no capable Members in the Assembly and no obvious way to maintain their momentum. Their present, tactics of repeated pin prick strikes are likely gradually to alienate public opinion. Nor has the Singapore Government, yet, used the sharp weapon of arrest, of the known Communist, leaders and organisers, though Mr. Lee Kuan Yew stated recently that, the time was approaching when this weapon could be used without damage to the Government' s political strength. The removal of its Communist organisers would wreck the Barisan Socialis. This weapon is available now too the Internal Security Council. But, it should be used at the most favourable time. The Communist, leaders should, if possible first, be stripped of popular support. This Mr. Lee Kuan Yew seems to be doing. If he can win a referendum on merger and Malaysia is accepted by the British and Malayan governments and the majority of the people of the Borneo territories, then Singapore will probably accept merger as inevitable and abandon the lost, cause of opposing it. The Communists will be left on their own.

9. Ironically the only immediate danger to the P.A.P. Government now apparent arises from merger: the referendum. Presumably the longer this can be delayed, the better is the prospect that the Barisan Socialis Influence will be eroded and the referendum won. Alternatively, if Mr. Lee Kuan Yew judges that he can win the referendum, he can hold it. If he wins, then he has beaten the Barisan Socialis and secured his position. If he loses, presumably merger cannot be forced upon Singapore and the whole project of Malaysia will have to be postponed,

10.Singapore remains a problem and a threat, to Malaya. But there is no immediate crisis. indeed, it could be argued that, the better plan is give Mr. Lee Kuan Yew longer to beat the Communists politically and to take Singapore into merger with the support, of public opinion rather then risk losing a referendum this year; nor should the Tunku, if he can avoid it, take repressive action against the Singapore Communists while they are able exploit, the merger issue and appear as the champions of the interests of Singapore against subjugation to a Malay government in Kuala Lumpur.

11.On this assessment, a postponement of merger for a year or two in the interests of the Borneo territories would not weaken Mr. Lee Kuan Yew' s position. It would also give him an excuse to postpone his referendum, if he so wished.

12.How far does the Singapore general election affect the timing of Malaysia? It has been assumed that Malaysia and merger of Singapore and Malaya must be achieved before the general election in Singapore due in 1964. Presumably the arguments underlying this assumption are that, after merger the Singapore electorate will vote more sensibly and reject the Barisan Socialis end the Communist, and the Alliance Government, will be able to arrest Communist organisers if this is needed before the elections.

13. The first test will come in the referendum which must be held before merger. It must also be held before Malaysia is put into effect, since the Tunku has said that if the referendum rejects merger, he will not, go on with Malaysia. Therefore, Malaysia is only possible after a successful referendum in Singapore.

14. But if Singapore accepts merger in a referendum, the Barisan Socialis and the Communists will have been defeated. It would surely then be unlikely that the Communist,s would capture Singapore in the election. Mr Lee Kuan Yew will have won a decisive victory and be in a much stronger position to counter the Communist threat. Moreover with merger accepted by Singapore , and Malaysia accepted by all concerned for introduction after a short preparatory period, the Singapore Government and the Internal Security Council would be better placed to arrest and detain Communist leaders if necessary.

15.Lastly, it is hard to see how merger could be successfully carried out by a Singapore Government, facing a general election and possibility of defeat on the issue of merger. The sounder course for the future of Malaysia would surely be that Singapore should first confirm its acceptance of merger in a general election and elect a Government with the political strength to carry it out.

16. Alternatively, if the Tunku considers any delay in Singapore to be too dangerous , it is open to him go ahead with the merger of Singapore and Malaya as soon as Malaysia has been agreed in principle and the main features of the constitution settled, without, waiting for Malaysia to be fully carried out in North Borneo.

17.There is also the problem of Brunei. At present Azahari has successfully mobilised public opinion against Malaysia. It is uncertain whether or not the Sultan will be prepared to commit Brunei to Malaysia against the wishes of his people; or whether he could maintain his position if he did. He is committed to elections this year. The result, could be decisive. The Sultan is probably waiting to see what happens in Sarawak and North Borneo. If as a result of the Cobbold Commission both these territories accept Malaysia, the Sultan may then feel that he can take Brunei in too; if the other two do not accept Malaysia he can postpone the issue in Brunei . If Malaysia is accepted in principle for Sarawak and North Borneo and the main terms agreed now but a period of several years granted in which to effect the change, Brunei will still have to reach its own decision, There is no reason to think that delay in carrying out Malaysia would prejudice that decision.

18. It is at least arguable that, delay in carrying out Malaysia would not prejudice the situation in Singapore or in Brunei. On the other hand, if Malaysia is rushed, fails to work satisfactorily, and is rapidly discredited, its failure must, have serious consequences in all the territories concerned.

Extract: A Letter dated 7.4.1962 to Cameron Fromanteel Cobbold, 1st Baron Cobbold KG GCVO PC DL was a British banker. He served as Governor of the Bank of England from 1949 to 1961 and as Lord Chamberlain from 1963 to 1971 from William Allmond Codrington Goode (1907–1986) Governor of British North Borneo, 1960–1963.

Source: Kumis Kumis